Abstract. We consider the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum size when both ties and unacceptable partners are allowed in preference lists. This problem is NP-hard and the current best known approximation algorithm achieves the approximation ratio 2 − c log N N , where c is an arbitrary positive constant and N is the number of men in an input. In this paper, we improve the ratio to 2 − c
Introduction
An instance of the stable marriage problem consists of N men, N women, and each person's preference list. A preference list is a totally ordered list including all members of the opposite sex depending on his/her preference. For a matching M between men and women, a pair of a man m and a woman w is called a blocking pair if m prefers w to his current partner and w prefers m to her current partner. A matching with no blocking pair is called stable. Gale and Shapley showed that every instance admits at least one stable matching, and proposed a polynomialtime algorithm to find one, which is known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm [9] . There are several examples of using the stable marriage problem in assignment systems. Probably, one of the most famous applications is to assign medical students to hospitals based on preference lists of both sides, which is known as NRMP in the U.S. [11, 28] , CaRMS in Canada [6] , SPA in Scotland [17, 18] , and JRMP in Japan [23] . Another application is to assign students to schools in Singapore [32] .
Considering such applications, it is unrealistic to require each participant to submit a preference list strictly ordering all members of the opposite side. One natural extension is to allow an incomplete list, namely, one may drop persons from the list whom he/she does not want to be matched with. In this case, a stable matching may not be a perfect matching, but all stable matchings for a
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fixed instance are of the same size [10] , and a slight modification of the GaleShapley algorithm can find one in polynomial time. In fact, a lot of well-known applications allow agents to submit incomplete lists. Another natural extension is to allow ties in the list [11, 16] . Again, it is easy to find a stable matching by a modified Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, if we allow both extensions, one instance can admit stable matchings of different sizes, and in a worst case, a smallest stable matching is of size only a half of a largest one. It is known that the size of a stable matching we obtain is essentially based on the way of tie-breaking (see [29] for example). If a matching system does not allow ties, participants may have to break ties independently by themselves, which may reduce the size of a resulting stable matching to a half the optimal. Hence, it is important to allow not only incomplete lists but also ties at the same time. Unfortunately, the problem of finding a maximum stable matching, which we call MAX SMTI (MAXimum Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete lists), is NP-hard [21, 29] , and the current best polynomial-time approximation algorithm achieves an approximation ratio 2 − c log N N , where c is an arbitrary positive constant [22] .
Simply speaking, the algorithm in [22] starts from an arbitrary initial stable matching, and at each iteration, successively improves the size of a stable matching. While |M |, the size of the current solution, is at most OP T 2 + c log N , where OP T is the size of an optimal solution, it can increase the size by at least one. Hence, the size of a stable matching is eventually greater than
OP T 2
+ c log N . To increase the size of a matching, it first finds a subset H of M , and removes H from M . It then adds a set K of new edges to the matching M − H, where K is computed from H. |K| is closely related to the approximation ratio; if all edges of K satisfy some good property (say, Ψ ), we can guarantee that the size of a stable matching we finally obtain is at least
+ O(|K|). In [22] , it was proved that there exists a good H that produces K such that |K| = 2|H| and all edges of K satisfy Ψ , but it was not known how to find it efficiently. Hence, we had to rely on an exhaustive search, which allows |H| (and hence |K|) to be at most O(log N ) for polynomial-time computation. So, the obvious problem was how to find this good subset H efficiently instead of the naive exhaustive search.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we modify the algorithm so that it does not need exhaustive search, improving the approximation ratio to 2−c
). To achieve this improvement, we relax the condition mentioned above. If K contains a subset K such that all edges in K satisfy Ψ , then we can obtain a stable matching of size at least
With this relaxation, we show that |K | can be set as large as O( |M |). To prove the correctness of this relaxed condition, we use the fact that a minimum vertex cover for bipartite graphs can be found in polynomial time. Also, for finding K that contains large K , we exploit a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum matching in bipartite graphs, and multiple use of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Related Results. As mentioned above, MAX SMTI was proved to be NPhard [21] and then to be APX-hard [12] . Subsequently, it was shown that MAX SMTI cannot be approximated within 21/19 unless P =NP [14] . For restricted inputs, there are a couple of approximation algorithms with factor better than two [13, 14] . Other than SMTI, research on stable matchings has been quite intensive recently, which includes studies on strong stability [20, 26] , rank-maximal matchings [19] , Pareto optimal matchings [1] , popular matchings [2] , and others [7, 3, 8] .
There are several optimization problems that resemble MAX SMTI, where designing a 2-approximation algorithm is trivial but obtaining a (2− )-approximation algorithm for a positive constant is extremely hard, such as Minimum Vertex Cover (MIN VC for short) and Minimum Maximal Matching (MIN MM for short). As is the case with MAX SMTI, there are a lot of approximability results for these problems by restricting instances. For example, MIN VC is approximable within 7/6 if the maximum degree of an input graph is bounded by 3 [5] , or within 2/(1 + ) if every vertex has degree at least |V | [25] . For MIN MM, there is a (2 − 1/d)-approximation algorithm for regular graphs with degree d [33] , and PTAS for planar graphs [31] . [30, 4, 15] . Very recently, it is improved to 2 − Θ(
Preliminaries

Notations and Definitions
In this section, we formally define MAX SMTI and approximation ratios. A goodness measure of an approximation algorithm T of a maximization problem is defined as usual: the approximation ratio of T is max{opt(x)/T (x)} over all instances x of size N , where opt(x) and T (x) are the size of the optimal and the algorithm's solution, respectively. Throughout this paper, we denote the optimal cost by OP T .
Algorithm LocalSearch(I)
In this section, we briefly review the algorithm LocalSearch presented in [22] . + c log N , Increase never fails, and hence we finally obtain a stable matching of size more than OP T 2 + c log N . This gives an upper bound on the approximation ratio of LocalSearch.
Improved Algorithm
To obtain a better upper bound, we improve the subroutine Increase, and show that it never fails if |M | <
. So, LocalSearch can obtain a stable matching of size at least 
5:
Break all ties in m's preference list in an arbitrary way. /* Call the resulting lists modified lists. */ } 6: For each woman w ∈ Y , do the following.
7:
{ Delete all men not in X from w's preference list.
8:
Break all ties in w's preference list in an arbitrary way. } 9: For k = 1 to 2B − 1, do the following.
10:
{ For each man m ∈ X, delete, from m's preference list, all women whose position (with respect to his modified list) is greater than k.
11:
Apply men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm to X and Y , and let the resulting matching be Q k . } 12: Partition X into |X|/2B sets X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X |X|/2B arbitrarily, each of which is of size 2B. 13: For each X i , do the following.
14:
{ For each man m ∈ X i , delete, from m's preference list, all women whose position (with respect to his modified list) is greater than 2B.
15:
Apply men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm to X i and Y , and let the resulting matching be Q 2B−1+i . } 16: Output Q 1 , · · · , Q 2B−1+|S|/2B . / *N o t et h a t|S| = |X| */ Finally, we give Increase. Fig. 1 shows an example of the execution of Increase up to the 8th line. (5) ...
M i
... ...
... ... ... 
5:
For each woman w ∈ M i , add an edge (P (w), w) to M i .
8:
For each man m ∈ M i , add an edge (m, Q i (m)) to M i .
9:
Construct a bipartite graph
Give an edge between m ∈ U i and w ∈ V i iff (m, w) blocks M i .
10:
Find a minimum vertex cover C i for G i .
11:
From M i , delete all edges connected to at least one vertex in C i .
12:
For Here, let us roughly explain an execution of the algorithm. Increase executes computation on all possible i. An example of computation on fixed i is depicted in Fig. 1 . Vertices corresponding to men are denoted by filled circles, while those corresponding to women are denoted by unfilled circles. Fig. 1 (1) shows an input matching M . M is given to Procedure MaxMatching, and it returns P ( Fig. 1  (2) ). This P defines M , and then, M and M are given to Procedure MultipleGS. Fig. 1 (3) shows X and Y used in Procedure MultipleGS. MultipleGS returns several matchings. Fix one matching Q i (Fig. 1 (4) ). Then, M i is defined by this Q i . Next, Increase increases the size of M (lines 6 through 8) by removing edges (m, w) ∈ M i from M , and by matching m and w to single woman and man, respectively, according to P and Q i . The resulting matching M i is shown in Fig. 1 (5) . However, M i may break the property Π. At lines 9 through 11, it removes some edges of M i so that the matching satisfies Π. This decreases the size of matching, but in the next section, we will show that there is a good i such that the size does not decrease too much.
Correctness Proof
It is not hard to see that Increase runs in time polynomial in N . (Note that both maximum matchings and minimum vertex covers for bipartite graphs can be computed in polynomial time [27] .) Also, observe that all M 1,i at the end of If an edge is in the path of length three starting from and ending with OPT-edges, then it is called good. Otherwise, it is bad. The following lemmas are proved in [22] . Let (m, w) be a good edge. Then, by Lemma 1 (iii), either w = m M opt (m) or m = w M opt (w). Without loss of generality, we assume that at least half of good edges of M satisfy m = w M opt (w), and prove that Increase finds a desirable i * during the execution of 1st through 12th lines. Otherwise, it finds i * during the execution of lines 13 through 24, whose proof is similarly obtained and hence is omitted in this paper. 
Lemma 1. [22] If (m, w) is a good edge of M , then (i) w
m M opt (m), (ii) m w M opt (w), and (iii) either w = m M opt (m) or m = w M opt (w).
Lemma 2. [22] Let t be a positive integer. If |M | <
. We consider the following three cases:
Case (1).
We show that i * , which we want to prove the existence, is 1. We first show that |Q 1 | ≥ 2B. Consider the execution of lines 10 and 11 for k = 1. Call preference lists of men after MultipleGS(M, M ) executes line 10 short lists. Consider a man m ∈ A 1 . There is only one woman in his short list, and she is M opt (m) by the definition of A 1 . Note that M opt (m) = M opt (m ) for m = m . So, there are at least |A 1 | ≥ 2B different women on the short lists of men in X. During the execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, every man proposes to a woman at the top of his list. So, at least 2B women receive a proposal. Once a woman receives a proposal, she is matched at the end of the algorithm. So,
is in his modified list as mentioned above, and m is matched with his first choice woman in the modified list. This means that
Case (2). Consider the execution of MultipleGS at lines 10 and 11 for k = i such that |A i | ≥ 3B. Define a short list similarly as (1). For 0 ≤ j ≤ 2B and 1 ≤ ≤ i, let a j, be the number of men in A j who is matched in Q i with a woman of his th choice with respect to his short list. Define
and
Then, the number of men who satisfy our condition, namely, who are matched with a woman at least as good as his partner in M opt , is at least S 1 , and the size of matching Q i is |Q i | = 0≤j≤2B,1≤ ≤i a j, = S 1 + S 2 . Note that, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ i), 1≤ <j a j, men in A j are matched with a woman strictly better than his partner in M opt (with respect to modified list). So, remaining ( 1≤ <j a j, ) ). Because S 2 ≤ 0≤j<i |A j |,
Also, the following inequality is obvious.
By adding (1) and (2), we obtain
This completes the proof. . So, 6B 2 − 3B < |X|/2. Next, by the condition of this case, we have that
Case (3)
Hence, when we partition |X| into |X|/2B sets, each of which contains 2B men at line 12, there is at least one X i such that |X i ∩ A 2B | ≥ B. Each man in X i ∩ A 2B has his partner in M opt at position greater than or equal to 2B in his modified list. This means that each man in X i ∩ A 2B has a modified list with length at least 2B. Because preference lists are cut into length 2B at the 14th line, if a man in X i ∩ A 2B gets a partner in Q 2B−1+i , she is at least as good as his partner in M opt .
It remains to show that all men in X i ∩ A 2B are matched in Q 2B−1+i : In the execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm at line 15, each man in X i has a preference list of length 2B. Suppose that there is a man m ∈ X i ∩ A 2B who is single in Q 2B−1+i . Then, m was rejected by all 2B women on his list. At each time a woman rejected m, she was matched. She never becomes single again and hence these 2B women are matched at the end of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This contradicts the assumption that m is single in Q 2B−1+i since there are only 2B men. Now, let us consider the matching M i * after Increase executes line 8. Note 
, m is matched with the same woman as in M , namely, ) is a constant fixed for the procedure MultipleGS. 
